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A PRESCRIPTION FOR CHANGE: CITIZENS 
UNITED’S IMPLICATIONS FOR 
REGULATION OF OFF-LABEL PROMOTION 
OF PRESCRIPTION PHARMACEUTICALS 
Kristie LaSalle* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Al Caronia, a pharmaceutical sales representative for Orphan 
Pharmaceuticals, a subsidiary of Jazz Pharmaceuticals, walked into 
a physician’s office in Great Neck, New York on November 2, 
2005.1 He had received several phone calls from the physician 
asking about Xyrem,2 Orphan’s medication for the treatment of 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2012; B.A. Biology, Swarthmore 
College, 2006. I owe an immeasurable debt of gratitude to Professor Aliza 
Kaplan, not only for teaching me to write, but for her tireless support and 
encouragement, and countless hours spent assisting in the writing and editing 
process. This Note could not have been possible without her love and support. I 
would like to thank Professors William Araiza and Joel Gora; Paul V. Avelar, 
James Beck, and Adam Michaels, Esqs.; and Robert Sobelman, J.D. Candidate, 
Brooklyn Law School, 2012; for their support, guidance, and suggestions during 
the writing process. I would also like to thank the entire editorial staff of the 
Journal of Law and Policy for their editorial assistance. Finally, thank you to my 
family, Richard, Cathy, Kimberlee, and Cadie for their support in all of my 
endeavors. 
1 Brief for Petitioner at 4, United States v. Caronia, No. 09 Cr. 5006 (2d 
Cir. filed Apr. 15, 2010) [hereinafter Caronia Brief]; Appendix to Caronia Brief 
at A-32 (transcript of conversation, indicating physicians’ office address). 
2 Id. at 3. This physician was an internal medicine specialist who, 
unbeknownst to Mr. Caronia, had never prescribed a single narcoleptic. Id. Prior 
to receiving phone calls from the physician, Mr. Caronia had never met him; 
however, after receiving repeated phone calls, Mr. Caronia decided to add the 
physician to the list of doctors whom he visited, and met with him for the first 
time on October 26, 2005. Id. At the October 26 meeting, the physician asked 
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cataplexy,3 a muscle disorder associated with narcolepsy,4 so Mr. 
Caronia brought Dr. Peter Gleason with him to discuss his 
experience prescribing the medicine.5 Mr. Caronia sat silently 
while Dr. Gleason spoke with the physician, answering questions 
about Xyrem’s different uses, including the treatment of Excessive 
Daytime Sleepiness (“EDS”), a new use then under review by the 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).6 So promising was that 
treatment, in fact, that the FDA approved Xyrem for treatment of 
EDS on November 18, 2005,7 just sixteen days after Mr. Caronia 
and Dr. Gleason visited the physician’s office. A year and a half 
later, however, on July 25, 2007, a federal grand jury indicted Mr. 
Caronia and Dr. Gleason for illegally promoting a prescription 
pharmaceutical.8 The physician, it turned out, was a confidential 
informant for the FDA, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(“FBI”) had recorded his meetings with Mr. Caronia and Dr. 
Gleason.9 Prior to trial, Dr. Gleason pleaded guilty to a reduced 
charge, becoming the first physician convicted of misbranding a 
drug.10 Mr. Caronia was found guilty of criminally misbranding a 
                                                          
Mr. Caronia about several unapproved, or off-label, uses of Xyrem, and asked to 
meet Dr. Gleason, a prominent physician in the field with experience prescribing 
Xyrem. Id. at 3–4. 
3 XYREM PRODUCT LABEL at 6 (July 17, 2002), available at http://www. 
accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2002/21196lbl.pdf. Xyrem is a sleep-
inducing depressant. Id. 
4 Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, Narcolepsy Fact Sheet, 
NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (last updated May 14, 2010), http://www.ninds.nih.gov/ 
disorders/narcolepsy/detail_narcolepsy.htm. Cataplexy is a debilitating symptom 
of narcolepsy, triggered by strong emotions like anger or fear. It manifests as a 
loss in muscle control, with the most severe cases resulting in physical collapse 
and the inability to move, speak, or open one’s eyes. Id. 
5 United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389–90 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
6 Caronia Brief, supra note 1, at 4; Appendix to Caronia Brief, supra note 
1, at A-41 (transcript of conversation, discussing the use of Xyrem for EDS). 
7 Letter from Russell Katz, Dir., Div. of Neurology Prods., Ctr. for Drug 
Eval., FDA, to Dr. Reardan, Orphan Med., Inc. (Nov. 18, 2005). 
8 See Indictment, United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 
2008) (No. 06 Cr. 229). 
9 Appendix to Caronia Brief, supra note 1, at A-32. 
10 Judge Strikes Down First Amendment Arguments In Pharmaceutical 
Sales Representative Federal Trial, FDA ADVER. & PROMOTION MANUAL & 
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prescription pharmaceutical for promoting Xyrem for EDS,11 even 
though the information related to the efficacy of Xyrem in treating 
EDS was accurate and non-misleading, as evidenced by the FDA’s 
approval of such a use a mere two weeks later. Why? 
The FDA forbids drug manufacturers from marketing their 
products for any use not expressly approved by the FDA.12 
Promotion of an unapproved use is deemed off-label promotion,13 
and may result in criminal and civil sanctions.14 The regulatory 
                                                          
NEWSL. 9 (FDA, Washington, D.C. Nov. 2008). 
11 Appendix to Caronia Brief, supra note 1, at A-85 to A-86 (verdict sheet). 
12 See Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 331 (West 2010). 
13 Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 28 n.1 (D.D.C. 1995) 
(Off-label use “refers to the use of a drug or device in a manner not approved by 
the FDA and not set forth in the product’s labeling materials.”). 
14 21 U.S.C.A. § 333. Many United States Attorneys’ Offices (USAOs), 
especially the District of Massachusetts, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
and the Northern District of California, aggressively prosecute misbranding 
infractions. See, e.g., Press Release, USAO, N. Dist. Cal., W. Scott Harkonen, 
Former Biotech CEO, Convicted of Wire Fraud (Sept. 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/can/press/2009/2009_09_29_ harkonen.convicted. 
press.html (announcing conviction of pharmaceutical CEO for promoting 
Actimmune for an off-label use); Press Release, USAO, Dist. Mass., Drug 
Maker Forest Pleads Guilty; Will Pay More Than $313 Million to Resolve 
Criminal Charges and False Claims Act Allegations (Sept. 15, 2010), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/Press%20Office%20-%20Press%20Release 
%20Files/Sept2010/SettlementPressRelease.html; Press Release, USAO, Dist. 
Mass., Pharmacia & Upjohn Company Inc. Pleads Guilty to Fraudulent 
Marketing of Bextra (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.justice. 
gov/usao/ma/Press%20Office%20-%20Press%20Release%20Files/Sept2009/ 
PharmaciaPlea.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Health and Human Servs., 
Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its 
History (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009 
pres/09/20090902a.html (announcing $2.3 billion settlement in the District of 
Massachusetts); Press Release, USAO, E. Dist. of Pa., Pharmaceutical Company 
Eli Lilly to Pay Record $1.415 Billion for Off-Label Drug Marketing (Jan. 15, 
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/News/Pr/2009/jan/lilly 
release.pdf; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Pharmaceutical Giant AstraZeneca 
to Pay $520 Million for Off-label Drug Marketing (Apr. 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-civ-487.html (announcing a plea 
deal in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania). 
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scheme surrounding off-label promotion15 is murky at best, and 
leaves manufacturers little absolute guidance.16 Policy is delineated 
largely by the FDA’s own interpretation of its regulatory power, 
disseminated piecemeal in guidance documents, and often driven 
by the FDA’s response to private litigation or other emerging 
issues.17 
Until recently, a similar regulatory scheme existed in a 
seemingly unrelated field of free speech jurisprudence: corporate 
political speech.18 Few recent Supreme Court decisions have 
garnered as much criticism as the 2010 decision in Citizens United 
v. FEC,19 in which the Supreme Court held that the Federal 
                                                          
15 See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–99; see generally infra Part II.B. 
16 See generally, e.g., FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES 
FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR 
SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF 
APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES, (Jan. 2009) 
[hereinafter GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES] available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/ 
op/goodreprint.html. 
17 For example, in one challenge to the FDA’s prohibition of off-label 
promotion, the FDA stipulated that no previous guidance document 
“independently authorizes the FDA to prohibit or sanction speech,” rendering 
moot an injunction against prohibiting certain forms of off-label promotion 
imposed at the trial court level. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney (WLF III), 202 
F.3d 331, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The FDA then promptly issued a guidance 
document, interpreting the Circuit Court’s ruling as a holding that the “FDA, 
consistent with its longstanding interpretation of the laws it administers, may 
proceed, in the context of case-by-case enforcement, to determine from a 
manufacturer’s written materials and activities how it intends that its products be 
used.” Notice; Decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 14,286 (Mar. 16, 2000) [hereinafter WLF III Decision Notice]. 
18 See generally Citizens United v. F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
19 Id.; see, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The “Devastating” Decision, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS, Feb. 25, 2010, at 39 (reporting the Citizens United decision arose from 
the Court’s political preference for the Republican Party and/or its general 
favoritism of corporate interests); Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good 
Thing: Campaign Speech After Citizens United, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2365, 
2368–69 (2010); Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4 Reject Corporate Spending Limit, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at A1. Perhaps the most well-known criticism of the 
holding came from President Obama. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President 
in the State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010) (“[L]ast week, the Supreme 
Court reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for 
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Elections Commission’s (“FEC”) regulation of corporate political 
expenditures was unconstitutional.20 Much of the criticism focused 
on the case’s implications for campaign finance;21 however, the 
Court’s language and reasoning22 may have dramatic implications 
for other areas of speech. In particular, Citizens United may signal 
a dramatic increase in the rights of those engaged in heavily-
regulated—and, to this point, heavily suppressed—commercial 
speech.23 One area of commercial speech jurisprudence that may 
change after Citizens United is the off-label promotion of 
pharmaceutical products. 
The Citizens United holding portrays an inherent mistrust of 
the use of convoluted regulatory schemes to abridge speech. The 
Court held that a muddled regulatory scheme essentially functions 
as a prior restraint: it leaves a potential speaker with the 
constitutionally unpalatable choice between remaining silent or 
asking the government whether its speech is lawful.24 Justice 
Kennedy’s declaration that prohibition of corporate independent 
expenditures constituted an “unprecedented governmental 
intervention into the realm of speech,”25 however, is misplaced: a 
similar intrusion on speech rights exists in pharmaceutical 
marketing regulation.26 The FDA’s prohibition of off-label 
promotion applies regardless of whether the marketing message the 
manufacturer wishes to disseminate is truthful and non-
                                                          
special interests—including foreign companies—to spend without limit in our 
elections . . . . I don’t think American elections should be bankrolled by 
America’s most powerful interests, or worse, by foreign entities.”). 
20 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
21 See generally Wilson, supra note 19. This Note takes no normative 
position on the wisdom or failings of Citizens United as applied to political 
speech. 
22 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896 (finding that muddled regulatory 
schemes function as a prior restraint on speech). 
23 See infra Part III. See also, generally, Tamara R. Piety, Citizens United 
and the Threat to the Regulatory State, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 
16 (2010). 
24 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896. 
25 Id. 
26 See generally Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–99 
(West 2010); GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16. 
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misleading.27 The FDA’s transgressions upon the manufacturers’ 
speech rights bear many of the marks condemned in Citizens 
United: the regulation constitutes “an outright ban [on speech], 
backed by criminal sanctions”;28 the FDA regulates speech by 
“carving out a limited exemption through an amorphous regulatory 
interpretation”;29 and in doing so, the FDA paternalistically 
“select[s] what . . . speech is safe for public consumption by 
applying an ambiguous test.”30 Thus, under Citizens United, the 
FDA’s prohibition of off-label promotion constitutes an 
unconstitutional abridgement of commercial speech. 
Fortunately, the similarities between the infirmities of the 
FEC’s regulation of independent corporate political expenditures at 
issue in Citizens United and those of the FDA’s regulation of off-
label promotion suggest that the solutions posed in Citizens United 
to enable continuing regulation while respecting corporations’ 
political speech rights31 will also cure the constitutional failings of 
the FDA’s off-label regulation. When properly construed, the 
government’s interest in promoting the public health and safety 
may be adequately addressed by requiring the speaker—that is, the 
pharmaceutical manufacturer—to disclose the off-label nature of 
its promotions.32 
At the outset, clarification is necessary as to the limited form of 
off-label promotion for which this Note advocates greater First 
Amendment protection. That limited category of speech is (1) 
truthful, accurate, and not misleading;33 (2) directed only to other 
                                                          
27 See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 351–52. Contra Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n N.Y, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (finding that, for 
commercial speech to warrant First Amendment protection, “it at least must . . . 
not be misleading”); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 510 (1996) 
(“[I]n keeping with our prior holdings, we conclude that a state legislature does 
not have the broad discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for 
paternalistic purposes. . . .”). 
28 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897. See also 21 U.S.C.A. § 333 
(describing criminal and civil sanctions that attend misbranding). 
29 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 889. 
30 See id. at 896. 
31 See id. at 915. 
32 See id. 
33 Fraudulent or inherently misleading commercial speech receives no First 
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prescribing healthcare professionals;34 and (3) relates to off-label 
uses of FDA-approved drugs only. Such speech would benefit the 
public at large, were it to be permitted.35 Physicians may prescribe 
a medication for any use, including off-label uses.36 Indeed, the 
FDA itself recognizes that off-label prescribing may be safe, and 
sometimes the standard of care for a particular patient or disease.37 
Providing the proper constitutional protection for truthful, non-
misleading off-label promotion would facilitate the dissemination 
of medical information to physicians. As explained below, public 
health will be enhanced by dissemination of such information, 
resulting in better-informed prescribing decisions by physicians.38 
This Note addresses the First Amendment concerns implicated 
by the FDA’s policies prohibiting off-label promotion of 
prescription medications, and presents a potential solution. Part II 
of this Note surveys the current state of the constitutional, 
statutory, and regulatory frameworks, as well as the litigation 
landscape, surrounding off-label promotion. Part III demonstrates 
that Citizens United’s rationale extends beyond political speech to 
heavily-regulated commercial speech. Specifically, the Court’s 
concern that the FEC’s complex and “amorphous regulatory 
interpretation”39 constitutes a restriction so inscrutable that it 
functions as a prior restraint finds a ready parallel in the FDA’s 
regulation of off-label promotion. 
Finally, in applying the Court’s commercial speech analysis 
                                                          
Amendment protection. See infra Part II.A; Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 
306 (Cal. 2002) (noting that, although some false political speech receives First 
Amendment protection, the protection does not extend to false commercial 
speech); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 566 (1980); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has 
never been protected for its own sake.”). 
34 This Note does not discuss the constitutional implications of the FDA’s 
regulation of Direct to Consumer (DTC) marketing. 
35 See infra Part IV.B. 
36 Use of Approved Drugs for Unlabeled Indications, 12 FDA DRUG BULL. 
4 (FDA, Washington, D.C., Apr. 1982). 
37 GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16, § III. 
38 See infra Part IV.B. 
39 Citizens United v. F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876, 889 (2010). 
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and the principles informing Citizens United, this Note concludes 
in Part IV that the FDA’s current policies regarding off-label 
promotion are unconstitutional under the First Amendment. A 
commercial speech analysis, the test for which was set forth in 
Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation v. Public Service 
Commission of New York,40 reveals that the constitutional failing is 
twofold. First, the FDA, and courts who have previously 
considered the constitutionality of the FDA’s prohibition on 
speech, have misconstrued the purported government interest:41 
rather, when properly construed, the interest is not advanced by—
and in fact may be hindered by—the prohibition of off-label 
promotion. Second, the current policy is more restrictive than 
necessary to serve that interest. Using United States v. Caronia42 as 
an example, this Note advocates the adoption of a disclosure 
regime, as approved of in Citizens United, which would better 
serve public health while being less restrictive of speech. 
II. COMMERCIAL SPEECH CHILLED: THE STATUTORY, REGULATORY, 
AND LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF OFF-LABEL PROMOTION 
Regardless of whether it is classified as pure, scientific, speech 
or commercial speech,43 off-label promotion of prescription 
pharmaceutical products is entitled to some First Amendment 
                                                          
40 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 566 (1980); see infra Part II.A. 
41 See United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2003) 
(announcing as a substantial government interest “the government’s interest in 
subjecting off-label uses to the FDA’s evaluation process as well as the 
government’s interest in preserving the integrity of the [Food Drug and 
Cosmetic Act’s] new drug approval process”); see also, generally, infra Part 
IV.A. 
42 United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
43 Although beyond the scope of this Note, there is good reason to question 
whether off-label promotion is truly commercial speech or whether it is in fact 
scientific, and therefore pure, speech entitled to the highest constitutional 
protection. See generally, e.g., Glenn C. Smith, Avoiding Awkward Alchemy—In 
the Off Label Drug Context and Beyond: Fully-Protected Independent Research 
Should Not Transmogrify into Mere Commercial Speech Just Because Product 
Manufacturers Distribute It, 34 WAKE FORREST L. REV. 963 (1999). 
LASALLE - FINAL.DOC 5/9/2011  4:16 PM 
 A Prescription for Change 875 
protection.44 Yet under the current regulatory regime created by the 
FDA, off-label promotion is all but prohibited.45 Challenges to the 
constitutionality of this absolute prohibition have thus far done 
little to vindicate manufacturers’ First Amendment rights.46 
A. The Commercial Speech Doctrine 
Despite the constitutional mandate that “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,”47 commercial speech, 
or speech which “does no more than propose a commercial 
transaction,” has historically received diminished protection under 
the First Amendment.48 Until the 1970s, commercial speech was 
entitled to no constitutional protection whatsoever.49 In 1976, the 
Supreme Court afforded limited constitutional protection to 
commercial speech.50 In Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, the Court struck down a state ban on 
                                                          
44 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 
U.S. 748, 761 (1976); see generally Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (extending, 
for the first time, qualified First Amendment protection to commercial speech); 
see generally infra Part II.A. 
45 See generally Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–99 
(West 2010); GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16; see generally infra 
Parts II.B, II.B.2. 
46 See generally Alliance for Natural Health U.S. v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 
2d 48 (D.D.C. 2010); Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 385; Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 
at 912; Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLF I), 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 
1998), vacated sub nom. WLF III, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Complaint, 
Allergan, Inc. v. United States, No. 09 Civ. 1879 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 1, 2009); 
see generally infra Parts II.C.1–II.C.4. 
47 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
48 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761. 
49 See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (finding “the 
Constitution imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects purely 
commercial advertising”). 
50 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773 (“What is at issue is whether 
a State may completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful 
[commercial] information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that 
information’s effect upon its disseminators and its recipients. . . . [W]e conclude 
that the answer to this [question] is in the negative.”).  
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advertising of drug prices by pharmacies.51 Eschewing the 
paternalistic argument that the petitioner had an interest in 
protecting “unwitting customers” from opting for “low-cost, low-
quality service,”52 the Court noted that the consumer, seller, and 
society at large had an interest in the “free flow of commercial 
information” that “may be as keen, if not keener by far, than [the] 
interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”53  
On the heels of Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme 
Court developed a test for determining whether commercial speech 
received First Amendment protection.54 In Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York, 
the Court struck down a ban on advertisements by electric utility 
services,55 in part because respondent’s reasons for the ban 
reflected its fear that the advertisements would needlessly increase 
energy consumption and costs.56 Echoing its sentiments in Virginia 
Board of Pharmacy, the Court rejected the government’s 
inherently paternalistic suppression of commercial speech.57 The 
Court set forth a four-prong test for assessing the constitutionality 
of governmental restrictions on commercial speech:58 the speech 
(1) “must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.”59 
However, the government may ban truthful, non-misleading 
speech if: (2) the asserted governmental interest in suppressing the 
                                                          
51 Id. at 762. 
52 Id. at 769. 
53 Id. at 763. 
54 See generally Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
55 Id. at 561. 
56 Id. at 560–61. 
57 See, e.g., id. at 562; see also id. at 574–75 (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(noting that the restriction at issue was “a covert attempt [by the state] to 
manipulate the choices of its citizens, not by persuasion or direct regulation, but 
by depriving the public of the information needed to make a free choice. . . . If 
the First Amendment guarantee means anything, it means that, absent clear and 
present danger, government has no power to restrict expression because of the 
effect its message is likely to have on the public”). 
58 See id. at 566. 
59 Id. 
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speech is substantial;60 (3) the regulation directly advances the 
substantial governmental interest; and (4) the restriction on speech 
is not “more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”61 
The Central Hudson test was refined and fortified in 44 
Liquormart v. Rhode Island, in which an unanimous Court struck 
down a Rhode Island prohibition on advertising liquor prices 
because the regulation failed to satisfy the fourth prong of the 
Central Hudson test.62 Although the Court was divided in its 
reasoning, Justice Thomas, concurring, expressed clear 
disapprobation for the regulation’s attempts to control consumer 
choice through the suppression of truthful, non-misleading 
commercial speech; he argued that if paternalism provides the sole 
support for a challenged regulation, application of the Central 
Hudson test should be unnecessary, as the law is “per se 
illegitimate.”63 It is clear that “the Supreme Court looks askance at 
restrictions on commercial speech imposed for paternalistic 
purposes.”64 
B. Statutory and Regulatory Framework of Off-Label 
Promotion 
The FDA exercises authority over the production, sale, and 
marketing of pharmaceutical products, pursuant to the Federal 
                                                          
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 486 (1996) (striking down 
the regulations because Rhode Island “failed to establish the requisite 
‘reasonable fit’ between its regulation and its goal”). 
63 Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In cases such as this, in which the 
government’s asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or service 
ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace, the balancing 
test adopted in [Central Hudson] should not be applied, in my view. Rather, 
such an ‘interest’ is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of 
‘commercial’ speech than it can justify regulation of ‘noncommercial’ speech.”). 
64 John Kamp, Daniel E. Troy & Elizabeth Alexander, FDA Marketing v. 
First Amendment: Washington Legal Foundation Legal Challenges to Off-Label 
Policies May Force Unprecedented Changes at FDA, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
555, 557 (1999). 
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Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).65 The FDCA mandates 
that all new drugs must be approved by the FDA as safe and 
effective, based on extensive clinical and pre-clinical testing for 
each intended use before introduction to the market.66 
The FDCA does not, however, directly constrain physicians’ 
decisions to prescribe drugs off-label.67 Congress has not endowed 
the FDA with the authority to prohibit physicians from prescribing 
medications off-label.68 Rather, the FDA has recognized that  
Congress did not intend FDA to interfere with the practice 
of medicine. Thus, once a product is approved for 
marketing for a specific use, FDA generally does not 
regulate how, or for what uses, physicians prescribe [it]. A 
licensed physician may prescribe a drug for other uses, or 
in treatments, regimens, or patient populations, that are not 
listed on the FDA-approved labeling.69 
Nevertheless, by manipulating the information disseminated to 
physicians, the FDA exerts substantial control over their 
prescribing habits.70 
                                                          
65 Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–99 (2010). 
66 See id. §§ 321, 355, 360m. 
67 See id. § 396 (reflecting Congress’s amendment of the FDCA to clarify 
that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or interfere with the 
authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally 
marketed [drug] to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate 
health care practitioner-patient relationship”). 
68 See id. This particular provision of FDAMA was enacted in response to 
the FDA’s assertion that “The [FDCA] provides [the] FDA with explicit 
regulatory authority over the use of [drugs].” James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. 
Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and 
Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 78 (1998) (quoting Attachment to 
Letter from FDA to Hon. Joseph Barton, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight 
and Investigation, House Comm. on Commerce (Apr. 14, 1995)). 
69 Beck & Azari, supra note 68, at 78 n.64 (quoting Michael Friedman, 
Deputy Comm’r for Operations, FDA, Prepared Statement Before the 
Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the 
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (Sept. 12, 1996)). 
70 See David M. Fritch, Speak No Evil, Hear No Evil, Harm the Patient?: 
Why the FDA Needs to Seek More, Rather Than Less, Speech From Drug 
Manufacturers On Off-Label Drug Treatments, 9 MICH. ST. U. J. MED & L. 315, 
336 (2005) (“While the FDA lacks direct authority to directly impose limitations 
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Within the drug approval process, the FDA retains authority 
over the labeling of the drug.71 A drug’s label must detail its risks, 
benefits, and adequate instructions for use.72 The FDA only 
approves a drug for sale if its labeling conforms to the FDA’s 
specifications.73 “Labeling” is a term of art, which, in addition to 
physical labels affixed to the drug’s packaging, encompasses all 
written, printed, or graphic material “accompanying” the drug.74 
“Accompanying” includes not only materials physically associated 
with the distribution of the drug itself, but all materials 
supplementing or explaining the product.75 According to the 
FDA’s own interpretation of the scope of its power, the term 
“labeling” encompasses nearly every form of manufacturer 
communication.76 The FDA has also adopted an expansive 
definition of promotion to include nearly every interpersonal 
contact between representatives of pharmaceutical manufacturers 
and prescribers or the public at large.77 
It is unlawful for the manufacturer to introduce a “misbranded” 
or “adulterated” drug into interstate commerce.78 A drug is 
                                                          
on physicians’ prescribing habits, its ability to limit the dissemination of 
information regarding off-label uses to prescribing physicians represents a 
significant indirect control over how physicians prescribe medications.”). 
71 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 352(f). 
72 See, e.g., id. 
73 Id. §§ 331(a), (d). 
74 Id. §§ 321(k–m). 
75 Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1948). 
76 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(1–2) (2010) (defining “labeling” as “[b]rochures, 
booklets, mailing pieces, detailing pieces, file cards, bulletins, calendars, price 
lists, catalogs, house organs, letters, motion picture films, film strips, lantern 
slides, sound recordings, exhibits, literature, and reprints, and similar pieces of 
printed, audio, or visual matter descriptive of a drug and references published 
(for example, the Physicians’ Desk Reference)” and promotional materials). 
77 See Joseph Leghorn, Elizabeth Brophy & Peter V. Rother, The First 
Amendment and FDA Restrictions on Off-Label Uses: The Call for a New 
Approach, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 391, 394 (2008) (identifying “certain company-
supported scientific or educational activities,” “initiation of person-to-person 
contact between sales representatives and prescribers,” “direct-to-consumer 
advertisements,” and “improper dissemination of information about an 
investigational drug during a clinical trial” as promotional activities). 
78 21 U.S.C.A. § 331. 
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misbranded or adulterated if its labeling is “false or misleading in 
any particular”79 or if it includes information regarding a use not 
approved by the FDA.80 Promotion of a drug in a manner 
inconsistent with its labeling results in the drug being 
“misbranded.”81 Because the FDA approves drugs for specific 
uses, promotional activity that covers uses which are not included 
in the label, or “off-label” promotion, is a form of misbranding82 
and is prohibited.83 The FDA is empowered to enjoin 
manufacturers who promote drugs for off-label uses,84 to seize 
those drugs,85 and in some cases, to seek criminal sanctions.86  
The prohibition is absolute, banning not only fraudulent and 
untruthful marketing activity, but truthful, non-misleading 
information as well.87 The FDA’s sweeping prohibition of off-label 
promotion has drawn significant criticism on constitutional 
grounds.88 First, it constitutes a restriction on who may speak,89 
                                                          
79 Id. § 352(a). 
80 Id. § 351. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. §§ 351–52 (2006). Off-label uses include use for a condition not 
included in the label, use in a patient population for which the drug has not been 
approved as safe and effective (such as pediatrics), or use in dosages different 
from those in the label (such as a higher than approved dose, or dosing twice, 
rather than once, daily). Id. 
83 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a) (2010); Citizen Petition Regarding the Food 
and Drug Administration’s Policy on Promotion of Unapproved Uses of 
Approved Drugs and Devices; Request for Comments, 59 Fed. Reg. 59820, 
59821 (Nov. 18, 1994).  
84 21 U.S.C.A. § 332(a).  
85 Id. § 334(a). 
86 Id. § 333. 
87 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a) (mandating that “[a]n advertisement for a 
prescription drug . . . shall not recommend or suggest any use that is not in the 
labeling,” regardless of the veracity of the claims made). 
88 See generally WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998); John E. Osborn, 
Can I Tell You the Truth? A Comparative Perspective on Regulating Off-Label 
Scientific and Medical Information, 10 YALE J. HEALTH & POL’Y L. & ETHICS 
299 (2010); Frederick R. Ball, Erin M. Duffy & Nina L. Russakoff, The First 
Amendment and Off-Label Promotion: Why the Court in United States v. 
Caronia Got it Wrong, 2009 BENDER’S HEALTHCARE L. MONTHLY 1 (2009); 
Fritch, supra note 70, at 315; A. Elizabeth Blackwell & James M. Beck, Drug 
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because physicians may freely discuss amongst themselves off-
label uses, and may prescribe a medication for any purpose,90 yet a 
manufacturer may not.91 Second, the restriction on commercial 
speech is more expansive than necessary to ensure public health 
and safety.92 
C. Legal Challenges to the FDA’s Prohibition of Off-Label 
Promotion 
In the past two decades, several legal challenges to the FDA’s 
regulatory scheme have been brought in federal court.93 These 
lawsuits, while challenging various provisions within the FDA’s 
regulatory framework, all attack the prohibition of off-label 
promotion as an impermissible abridgement of commercial speech 
in violation of the First Amendment.94 Constitutional challenges to 
this commercial speech restriction have met with mixed results, 
                                                          
Manufacturers’ First Amendment Right to Advertise and Promote Their 
Products for Off-Label Use: Avoiding a Pyrrhic Victory, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
439 (2003). 
89 See infra Part III.B.1. 
90 Viagra, for example, is best known for its use in treating erectile 
dysfunction (ED), but, it was originally approved for use in treating angina—
chest pain associated with cardiac disease. Its discovery and success as an ED 
drug hails from what was originally an off-label use. See Fritch, supra note 70, 
at 319 n.9 (citations omitted). Efficacy has also been demonstrated for other off-
label uses, including treating premature babies with under-developed lungs. See 
id. Another example can be found in verapamil, a calcium-channel blocker 
FDA-approved for treatment of heart disease. Physicians find them to be 
efficacious for treating headaches, including migraines, yet the FDA has not 
approved them for treatment of headaches. See Daniel B. Klein & Alexander 
Tabarrok, Do Off-Label Drug Practices Argue Against FDA Efficacy 
Requirements?, 67 AM. J. ECON. & SOCIOL. 743, 756 (2008). 
91 See generally 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 351–52; 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a). 
92 See infra Part III.D.2. 
93 See generally infra Parts II.C.1–II.C.4; Alliance for Natural Health, U.S. 
v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2010); United States v. Caronia, 576 F. 
Supp. 2d 385, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 
912, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2003); WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51; Complaint, Allergan, supra 
note 46. 
94 See supra note 93. 
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leaving the status of the FDA’s prohibition of off-label promotion 
very much unsettled. 
1. Washington Legal Foundation 
The first challenge to the FDA’s policies came in 1997, and 
concerned two guidance documents restricting (1) dissemination of 
peer-reviewed scientific journal articles and textbooks by 
manufacturers and (2) manufacturer-sponsored continuing medical 
education programs (“CMEs”).95 The Washington Legal 
Foundation (“WLF”)96 sought to enjoin the FDA from enforcing 
these policies on free speech grounds.97 After determining that off-
label promotion constituted commercial speech, the district court 
applied the Central Hudson test.98 The court found that the speech 
at issue was truthful and not inherently misleading.99 Although the 
court recognized that the government had a substantial interest in 
protecting public health and safety by incentivizing manufacturers 
to seek FDA approval for off-label uses,100 which was directly 
advanced by the challenged regulations,101 it nevertheless declared 
the FDA’s policies unconstitutional because it found the restriction 
on speech to be more extensive than necessary.102 The court found 
that there were less restrictive alternatives available, including a 
                                                          
95 See Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational 
Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074 (Dec. 3, 1997) [hereinafter Final Guidance 
Regulation]; Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800 
(1996). 
96 The Washington Legal Foundation is “a nonprofit public interest law and 
policy center that defends ‘the rights of individuals and businesses to go about 
their affairs without undue influence from government regulators.’” WLF I, 13 
F. Supp. 2d at 54 (internal citations omitted); Wash. Legal Found., WLF 
Mission, WASH. LEGAL FOUND., http://www.wlf.org/org/mission.asp (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2011). 
97 WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 54. 
98 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 567 (1980); see supra Part II.A. 
99 WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 65–69. 
100 Id. at 69–71. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 72–74. 
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“full, complete, and unambiguous disclosure by the manufacturer” 
that the advocated use is off-label and not FDA approved.103 Faced 
with such disclosure, “[a] physician would be immediately alerted 
to the fact that the ‘substantial evidence standard’ had not been 
satisfied, and would evaluate the communicated message 
accordingly.”104  
After the decision in WLF I, the Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997 (“FDAMA”) took effect.105 Within 
FDAMA, the very policies declared unconstitutional in WLF I 
were codified in section 401.106 In a separate decision, WLF II,107 
the district court sua sponte extended its WLF I ruling to apply to 
section 401 of FDAMA, declared that section unconstitutional, and 
enjoined the FDA from enforcing it.108  
On appeal, the FDA disclaimed its original argument that 
FDAMA authorized the FDA to regulate or prohibit speech,109 
stating instead that “in its view, neither the FDAMA nor the CME 
guidance independently authorizes the FDA to prohibit or sanction 
speech.”110 At oral argument the FDA elected to interpret section 
401 as providing a “safe harbor,” that ensures that certain types of 
conduct would not be used against manufacturers in criminal 
actions for misbranding.111 It insisted, however, that FDAMA 
permitted criminal sanctions against any manufacturer who 
completely disregarded section 401’s conditions on off-label 
promotion “provides that a manufacturer who disregards [section 
                                                          
103 Id. at 73; see also id. 68–69. 
104 Id. at 73. 
105 Food & Drug Administration Modernization Act, Pub L. No. 105-115 
(1997) (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 360aaa (West 2010)). 
106 See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney (WLF II), 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 87 
(1999). 
107 See generally id. The opinion in WLF II was necessitated after the 
government sought declaratory relief from the WLF I court that the court’s 
ruling did not apply to section 401 of FDAMA. Id. at 83–84. 
108 Id. at 88–89. 
109 See WLF III, 202 F.3d 331, 335 (2000). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 335. 
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401]’s conditions . . . might be liable in some fashion.”112 The 
FDA’s new interpretation brought its position in line with WLF’s, 
eliminating the controversy.113 The D.C. Circuit lamented the lost 
opportunity to resolve “a difficult constitutional question of 
considerable practical importance” and noted that, because of the 
FDA’s concession, “the dispute between the parties has 
disappeared before our eyes.”114 It vacated the WLF I and WLF II 
rulings for want of controversy.115 In the wake of WLF III, the 
FDA interpreted the Circuit’s ruling to mean that the “FDA, 
consistent with its longstanding interpretation of the laws it 
administers, may proceed, on a case-by-case basis, to determine 
from a manufacturer’s written materials and activities how it 
intends that its products be used.”116 Although the WLF decisions 
addressed only a narrow subset of off-label speech—distribution of 
scientific literature and sponsorship of CMEs117—the district 
court’s vacated opinions influenced subsequent decisions 
addressing the constitutionality of restrictions on off-label 
promotion.118 
2. United States v. Caputo 
In 2003, the FDA’s prohibition of off-label promotion faced 
another constitutional challenge.119 In United States v. Caputo, the 
defendants challenged the FDA’s prohibition of off-label 
promotion of a medical device.120 The district court largely 
                                                          
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 336. 
116 WLF III Decision Notice, supra note 17. 
117 See Final Guidance Regulation, supra note 95; Advertising and 
Promotion, supra note 95. 
118 See, e.g., United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921–22 (N.D. 
Ill. 2003) (adopting the reasoning of the WLF district court). 
119 See generally id. 
120 Id. at 912. This case is notable for Caputo’s particularly egregious 
marketing behavior and disregard for FDA regulations, see id. at 915–16; 
however the holding and analysis ultimately affect all manufacturers, regardless 
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adopted WLF I’s reasoning, but departed from WLF I in holding 
that the prohibition was constitutional.121 In addressing the FDA’s 
interest in restricting speech, the court reasoned that “[p]ermitting 
manufacturers to promote off-label uses would completely 
undermine the government’s interest in subjecting off-label uses to 
the FDA’s evaluation process as well as the government’s interest 
in preserving the FDCA’s new drug approval process.”122 
Distinguishing the promotion at issue in Caputo from the 
dissemination of academic writing and sponsorship of CMEs in 
WLF I, Caputo found prohibition of all off-label promotion—even 
that which is truthful and non-misleading—to be constitutional 
because “permitting Defendants to engage in all forms of truthful, 
non-misleading promotion of off-label use would severely frustrate 
the FDA’s ability to evaluate the effectiveness of off-label uses.”123 
Because the court could not envision a less restrictive means of 
achieving this interest, it preserved the FDA’s authority to prohibit 
off-label commercial speech.124 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit did 
not resolve the First Amendment quandary, and declared that it 
“[f]ortunately . . . need not decide today whether a seller of drugs . 
. . has a constitutional right to promote off label uses,”125 affirming 
Caputo on more narrow grounds.126 
3. Allergan 
More recently, the FDA commenced a barrage of civil and 
criminal sanctions against the manufacturer Allergan, Inc. for 
alleged off-label marketing of its pharmaceutical product, 
Botox.127 Allergan fought back, filing a civil suit challenging the 
                                                          
of their culpability. 
121 Id. at 921–22. 
122 Id. at 921. 
123 Id. at 922. 
124 Id. 
125 United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2008). 
126 See id. at 941 (declining to proceed with a Central Hudson analysis 
because, given the particularly egregious marketing endeavors of Mr. Caputo, 
“[t]here was no lawful activity . . . to promote”). 
127 See Information, United States v. Allergan, Inc., No. 10 Cr. 375 (N.D. 
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constitutionality of the prohibition on First Amendment grounds.128 
With the threat of massive civil and criminal penalties looming, 
Allergan was permitted to plead guilty and settle the civil 
complaints, conditioned upon abandonment of its First 
Amendment suit.129 The settlement left the question of the 
constitutionality of the FDA’s prohibitions unanswered. 
4. Caronia’s First Amendment Challenge 
The FDA investigated alleged off-label promotion of Xyrem by 
Jazz Pharmaceuticals, resulting in the indictment of Caronia on 
two misdemeanor counts:130 (1) conspiracy to misbrand Xyrem by 
marketing it to the undercover informant-physician for off-label 
uses;131 and (2) misbranding a drug held for sale in interstate 
commerce.132 Caronia moved to dismiss the charges because, inter 
                                                          
Ga. Sept. 1, 2010); Complaint, United States ex rel. Hallivis v. Allergan, Inc., 
No. 09 Civ. 3434 (D. Md. Oct. 26, 2009); Complaint, United States ex rel. 
Beilfuss v. Allergan, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 1883 (D. Mass. May 27, 2008); 
Complaint, United States ex rel. Lang v. Allergan, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 1288 (N.D. 
Ga. June 5, 2007).  
128 Complaint, Allergan, supra note 46. 
129 See Press Release, Allergan, Inc., Allergan Resolves United States 
Government Investigation of Past Sales and Marketing Practices Relating to 
Certain Therapeutic Uses of Botox® (Sept. 1, 2010), available at 
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/cc/Allergan_settlement090110.pdf (“To resolve the 
criminal and civil investigation, Allergan was required by the Government to 
dismiss Allergan’s First Amendment lawsuit . . . in which Allergan sought a 
ruling that it could proactively share truthful scientific and medical information 
with the medical community to assist physicians in evaluating the risks and 
benefits [of off-label uses of Botox].”(emphasis added)); see also Press Release, 
Dep’t of Justice, Allergan Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $600 Million to 
Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Botox® (Sept. 1, 2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/10-civ-988.html. 
130 United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
131 Id.; see Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331(a) & (k) (West 
2010); Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.A. § 
371 (West 2010). 
132 Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 389. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331(k) & 
331(a)(1). 
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alia, the misbranding provisions violated his free speech rights.133 
The court found that the off-label promotion constituted 
commercial speech,134 and that the provisions did not violate the 
First Amendment.135 
Under Central Hudson, the threshold question is not whether 
the speech itself is unlawful: such a test would present a closed 
tautology;136 the question is whether the conduct urged by the 
speech is unlawful.137 Relying on WLF I, Caronia held that, 
because physicians may prescribe Xyrem for off-label uses, 
Caronia’s speech did not concern unlawful activity,138 and that the 
statements were not inherently misleading.139 Adopting the 
reasoning of WLF I and Caputo, Caronia found that physicians 
receiving Caronia’s speech were generally aware of the FDA-
approval process and its implications, and could adequately 
evaluate the validity of their claims: the Caronia court wrote 
“[g]iven the sophistication of the audience to whom the off-label 
uses were promoted, this Court cannot conclude . . . that 
                                                          
133 Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 393. 
134 Id. at 396.  The court noted that:  
regardless what else might have been covered in his discussions, 
Caronia’s alleged speech was made on behalf of the manufacturer and 
clearly (1) encouraged physicians to prescribe Xyrem, (2) referred to a 
specific product, and (3) was economically motivated. Any such 
promotion by Caronia to physicians on behalf of Xyrem’s manufacturer 
of the drug’s off-label uses would be commercial speech and be 
“entitled to the qualified but nonetheless substantial protection 
accorded to commercial speech.” 
Id. (citing Bolger v. Young Drug Prods. Co., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983)). 
135 Id. at 402. 
136 See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 66 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated sub nom. WLF 
III, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting the FDA’s argument that off-label 
speech concerns unlawful activity because off-label promotion violates federal 
law). 
137 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 n.7 (1996) (“[T]he 
First Amendment does not protect speech about unlawful activities.” (emphasis 
added)). 
138 Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 397–98. 
139 Id. 
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[Caronia’s] speech was inherently misleading.”140 
Turning to the second prong of the Central Hudson test, 
Caronia found, relying on WLF I, that restricting off-label 
promotion served a substantial government interest.141 Caronia 
acknowledged the substantial government interest in protecting the 
health and the public142 and that, in order to attain that objective, 
the government had “a substantial interest in compelling 
manufacturers to get off-label treatments on-label.”143 In 
addressing the third prong of the Central Hudson test, and relying 
yet again on WLF I and Caputo, the Caronia court ruled that 
prohibition of off-label promotion directly advanced the 
“substantial government interest in requiring manufacturers to 
submit supplemental applications to obtain FDA approval for new 
uses of previously approved drugs.”144 
Finally, addressing the fourth prong of the Central Hudson 
test—whether the prohibition is only as extensive as is necessary to 
further the government’s interest145—the court distinguished WLF 
I, which concerned only a limited form of off-label speech.146 The 
Caronia court failed to recognize the WLF I finding that a less 
restrictive alternative to absolute prohibition existed: namely, “full, 
complete, and unambiguous disclosure by the manufacturer of its 
involvement in the subject activities and the fact that the uses 
discussed were off-label,”147 and relied instead on WLF I dicta that 
                                                          
140 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (citing United States 
v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2003)). 
141 Id. at 398. 
142 Id. 
143 Id.; accord Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 921; WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 
72 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated sub nom. WLF III, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(“[O]ne of the few mechanisms available to the FDA to compel manufacturer 
behavior [with regard to ensuring the safety of new uses for drugs] is to 
constrain marketing options; i.e. control labeling, advertising, and marketing.”). 
144 Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 398. 
145 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 569–70 (1980). 
146 See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 54; see also Final Guidance Regulation, 
supra note 95; Advertising and Promotion, supra note 95. 
147 Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 399 (citing WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 57–
58). 
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“[w]ere manufacturers permitted to engage in all forms of 
marketing of off-label treatments, a different result might be 
compelled.”148 Instead, it relied on Caputo’s finding that a First 
Amendment challenge to the off-label prohibition threatened the 
FDA’s ability to control and prohibit manufacturer’s off-label 
promotion.149 Noting that no less restrictive means of advancing 
the government’s interest was identified in Caputo,150 Caronia 
concluded that “the prohibitions . . . pass constitutional muster 
under the fourth prong of Central Hudson.”151 
III. CITIZENS UNITED: FROM POLITICAL SPEECH TO COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United v. F.E.C. has 
garnered significant criticism for its implications for corporate 
participation in political discourse.152 However, the Court’s 
reasoning in striking down the FEC’s regulatory scheme153 may 
impact other areas of heavily regulated speech, including some 
forms of commercial speech, such as the off-label promotion of 
prescription pharmaceuticals. 
                                                          
148 Id. (second emphasis added). 
149 United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
150 Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 399 (citing Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 
922). 
151 Id. at 401–02 (“[T]his Court is unable to identify non-speech restrictions 
that would likely constrain in any effective way manufacturers from 
circumventing [the FDA’s] approval process.” (citing Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 
at 922)). 
152 See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 19, at 39 (reporting the Citizens United 
decision arose from the Court’s political preference for the Republican Party 
and/or its general favoritism of corporate interests); Walker Wilson, supra note 
19, at 2368–69; Liptak, supra note 19, at A1; Barack Obama, Remarks by the 
President in the State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010) (“[L]ast week, the 
Supreme Court reversed a century of law to open the floodgates for special 
interests—including foreign companies—to spend without limit in our elections 
. . . . Well, I don’t think American elections should be bankrolled by America’s 
most powerful interests, and worse, by foreign entities.”). 
153 Citizens United v. F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876, 896 (2010). 
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A. The Citizens United Decision 
In January 2008, Citizens United, a non-profit organization, 
aired Hillary: the Movie154 that criticized then-Senator Hillary 
Clinton,155 and sought to dissuade voters from electing her as the 
Democratic candidate for President.156 Citizens United wanted to 
make the film available via online video-on-demand in the days 
leading to the 2008 primary.157 It feared, however, it might violate 
section 441b of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act,158 which 
prohibited corporations and unions from using general treasury 
funds to finance advocacy for the election or defeat of a 
candidate.159 Citizens United sought a declaratory judgment that it 
could air Hillary, as well as injunctive relief against the FEC in a 
District of Columbia trial court.160 That court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the FEC, finding the law constitutional, both 
facially and as applied to Citizens United.161 The Supreme Court 
heard the appeal directly, and held section 441b’s prohibition of 
corporate electioneering unconstitutional.162 Writing for the Court, 
Justice Kennedy called the FEC’s ambiguous regulatory scheme an 
“unprecedented governmental intervention into the realm of 
speech.”163  
                                                          
154 Id. at 886–87. 
155 Id. at 887 (“[T]o promote the film, [Citizens United] produced two 10-
second ads and one 30-second ad for Hillary. Each ad includes a short (and in 
our view, pejorative) statement about Senator Clinton.”). 
156 Id. at 888. 
157 Id. at 887–88. 
158 Id. at 887. 
159 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(2) (West 
2010). 
160 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 913; see 2 U.S.C. § 441b. 
163 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896. 
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B. But Is It Unprecedented? Citizens United and Off-Label 
Promotion 
A regulatory scheme analogous to the regulation of corporate 
political speech found unconstitutional in Citizens United exists in 
the prohibition of off-label promotion.164 An examination of the 
parallels between the FDA’s regulation of off-label promotion and 
the FEC’s regulation of corporate political speech reveals that the 
FDA’s regulation should fail under the principles set forth in 
Citizens United. 
1. The FDA’s Prohibition of Off-Label Promotion By 
Manufacturers, Like the Prohibitions in Citizens United, 
Constitutes a Restriction On Who May Speak 
Citizens United recognized that the ban on corporate 
independent expenditures constituted a restriction on who may 
speak.165 In terms reaching more broadly than political speech 
alone, the Court noted that: 
[p]remised on mistrust of governmental power, the First 
Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain 
subjects or viewpoints. Prohibited too are restrictions 
distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech 
by some but not others. As instruments to censor, these 
categories are interrelated: speech restrictions based on the 
identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to 
control content.166 
The Court continued, finding that if the regulation applied to 
individuals, not corporations, engaged in political advocacy, “no 
one would believe that it is merely a time, place, or manner 
restriction on speech. Its purpose and effect are to silence entities 
whose voices the Government deems to be suspect.”167 
Likewise, the FDA’s prohibition of off-label promotion is a 
                                                          
164 See supra Part II.B. 
165 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898–99. 
166 Id. (emphasis added). 
167 Id. at 898. 
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restraint based upon government mistrust of a particular speaker. 
Believing, rightly or wrongly, that a manufacturer may attempt to 
persuade physicians to prescribe their drug, and believing, rightly 
or wrongly, that such a speech is harmful,168 the FDA severely 
limits the ways in which manufacturers may discuss with 
physicians truthful, non-misleading, peer-reviewed scientific or 
medical journal articles related to an off-label use.169 Yet that 
discussion between two physicians, when each is unaffiliated with 
a pharmaceutical company, is fully protected scientific speech 
entitled to the highest First Amendment protection.170 When the 
manufacturer or its agent speaks, however, the same speech 
magically transforms into commercial speech171—the red-headed 
stepchild of First Amendment jurisprudence172—and the 
manufacturer may face criminal liability.173 The facts of Caronia 
make the disparity clear: Dr. Gleason became the first physician 
ever prosecuted under the misbranding statutes174 because he spoke 
about an off-label use of a drug on behalf of its manufacturer.175 
                                                          
168 But see infra Parts VI.A & B. 
169 See Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–99 (West 2010); 
GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16, § II. 
170 See Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 
384, 458 (D.N.J. 2009) (citing WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 63 (D.D.C. 1998)); 
WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 63 (noting that “[i]t is beyond dispute that when 
considered outside of the context of manufacturer promotion of their drug 
products, CME seminars, peer-reviewed medical journal articles and 
commercially-available medical textbooks merit the highest degree of 
constitutional protection” because “[s]cientific and academic speech reside at 
the core of the First Amendment”). 
171 See United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395–96 (E.D.N.Y. 
2008); WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 62–65. See also, generally, United States v. 
Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (failing to even consider whether 
off-label promotion constitutes commercial speech before commencing a 
Central Hudson analysis). 
172 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (noting 
that commercial speech receives “a limited measure of protection, 
commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment 
values” (emphasis added)). 
173 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(k) (2010). 
174 Judge Strikes Down First Amendment Arguments, supra note 10, at 9. 
175 Id. 
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Had he instead discussed the same topic, made the same 
recommendations, and said the same exact words while at a casual 
dinner with a colleague, no criminal sanctions would attach.176 
That speech regarding off-label uses of a drug becomes criminal 
only when a manufacturer speaks makes the constitutional 
infirmity of the FDA’s regulation pellucid. 
2. Under Citizens United, the FDA’s Ambiguous Regulatory 
Scheme Functions Like a Prior Restraint on Speech 
Citizens United identified section 441b as “an outright ban [on 
speech], backed by criminal sanctions.”177 Acknowledging that the 
ban does not constitute a prior restraint on speech in the traditional 
sense,178 the Court noted that “[a]s a practical matter, however, 
given the complexity of the regulations and the deference courts 
show to administrative determinations, a speaker who wants to 
avoid the threats of criminal liability and the heavy costs of 
defending against FEC must ask a governmental agency for prior 
permission to speak.”179 That is, a corporation could not discern 
whether its proposed speech was lawful from the perplexing 
regulatory scheme cobbled together by the FEC, and was therefore 
forced either to remain silent or to ask the government to pass upon 
the acceptability of its speech prior to speaking.180 The FEC, in 
essence, created a regulatory regime where it could “select what 
political speech is safe for public consumption by applying 
ambiguous tests”181 which the Court roundly criticized.182 
                                                          
176 In Caronia, the District court was even hesitant to apply the ban to Dr. 
Gleason—noting his favored status as a physician. See Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 
at 395–96. 
177 Citizens United v. F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010). 
178 Id. at 895 (noting that “prospective speakers are not compelled by law to 
seek an advisory opinion from the FEC before the speech takes place” (emphasis 
added)). 
179 Id. at 896 (citing Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 2 U.S.C.A. § 437(f) 
(West 2010)) (equating the regulation to “licensing laws implemented in the 
16th- and 17th century England, laws and governmental practices of the sort that 
the First Amendment was drawn to prohibit”). 
180 See id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 437(f)). 
181 Id. at 896. The Supreme Court held that “[t]he Government may 
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The complexity of the FDA’s ban of off-label promotion has 
clear parallels to the regulatory scheme struck down in Citizens 
United. The FDA’s regulatory scheme is hopelessly muddled, so as 
to fail to provide clear guidance as to what promotional activities 
are permitted. Despite the codification of the FDA’s authority in 
the FDCA183 and FDAMA,184 the FDA continues to disseminate 
guidance documents containing “amorphous regulatory 
interpretation”;185 and in so doing it essentially “select[s] what . . . 
speech is safe for public consumption by applying an ambiguous 
test.”186 As in Citizens United, a regulatory agency—this time the 
FDA—has constructed an abstruse regulatory scheme that 
essentially functions as a prior restraint on speech.187  
                                                          
regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and disclosure 
requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether.” Id. at 886. 
182 Id. at 895–96 (comparing the FEC’s regulatory scheme to the English 
licensing laws of the 16th and 17th centuries that prompted the ratification of the 
First Amendment, and describing the ill-effects of such a regulatory scheme on 
modern free speech). 
183 See Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–99 (West 2010). 
184 See FDAMA, Pub L. 105-115 (1997) (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 360aaa 
(West 2010)). 
185 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 889. 
186 Id. at 896. 
187 See id. at 895–96. Although commercial speech receives some First 
Amendment protection, see supra Part II.A, the Supreme Court has intimated 
from the inception of the commercial speech doctrine that some protections 
available to other speech might be unavailable to commercial speech. In 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, Justice Blackmun noted that because 
“commercial speech may be more durable than other kinds [of speech] . . . there 
is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely.” 
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
772 n.24 (1976) (emphasis added). As a result, “the greater objectivity and 
hardiness of commercial speech, may make it less necessary to tolerate 
inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker,” id. (emphasis added), 
and “may also make inapplicable the prohibition against prior restraints.” Id. 
(emphasis added). Relying on this equivocal, footnoted statement in Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy, the Central Hudson Court found it would be 
appropriate to require “a system of previewing advertising campaigns to insure 
that they will not defeat” governmental objectives. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. 
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 571 n.13 (1980). The 
Supreme Court, however, has never definitively held that the doctrine of prior 
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In the FDA’s most recent interpretation of its own authority to 
regulate the dissemination of truthful, non-misleading, peer-
reviewed scientific journal articles, the infirmity of a de facto prior 
restraint is pellucid.188 The provision of FDAMA challenged in 
WLF II, section 401,189 sunsetted in 2006,190 leaving no guidance 
as to how, if at all, manufacturers could disseminate journal 
articles to physicians.191 After three years without guidance, the 
FDA at last published its “Good Reprint Practices.”192 Riddled 
with subjective criteria for appropriate dissemination of journal 
reprints,193 it does little to provide adequate guidance. First, the 
Good Reprint Practices dictate that journal articles must be 
“distributed separately from information that is promotional in 
nature,” yet nowhere do they define promotional material,194 and 
the FDA has previously interpreted promotional material to include 
“literature [and] reprints.”195 Second, the guidance document 
states, without explanation, that “[t]he information must not . . . 
pose a significant risk to public health, if relied upon.”196 Third, it 
omits the “safe harbor” contained within section 401, as interpreted 
by the FDA in WLF III.197 It perpetuates, however, the FDA’s 
“interpretation” of WLF III’s holding, notwithstanding the fact that 
the case was mooted for lack of controversy based on the existence 
                                                          
restraint absolutely does not apply to commercial speech. 
188 See GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16. 
189 FDAMA, Pub L. No. 105-15, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997) (codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 360aaa. (2006)). 
190 GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16 § II. 
191 See, e.g., Robert I. Field, The FDA’s New Guidance for Off-Label 
Promotion Is Only a Start, 33 P&T 220, 220 (2008) (noting that “FDAMA’s 
limitations on off-label promotion expired on September 30, 2006, and Congress 
has yet to reauthorize them” and that what was, at the time, a draft guidance was 
“an attempt to fill the void”). 
192 See generally GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16. 
193 See generally id. 
194 See id. § IV. B. 
195 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(1-2) (2010). 
196 GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16 § IV.A. 
197 See Stephen Barlas, New FDA Guidance on Off-Label Promotion Falls 
Short for Everyone: Obama Administration Is Likely to Revisit It, 34 P&T 122, 
122 (2009). 
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of this safe harbor:198 the guidance document states that the 
“FDA’s legal authority to determine whether distribution of 
medical or scientific information constitutes promotion of an 
unapproved ‘new use’ or whether such activities cause a product to 
violate the [FDCA] has not changed.”199 Because the FDA enabled 
itself, in the wake of WLF III, to “proceed, in the context of case-
by-case enforcement, to determine whether in the manufacturer’s 
written materials and activities . . . .”200 off-label promotion has 
occurred, the Good Reprint Practices leaves a manufacturer with 
no guidance whatsoever as to what it may or may not lawfully do. 
The manufacturer must either remain silent201 or seek 
clarification—essentially permission—from the FDA to engage in 
promotional speech.202 
One consideration that led the Citizens United Court to declare 
the FEC’s ban on speech unconstitutional has particular relevance 
to the FDA’s regulatory scheme. In Citizens United, the Court 
noted that “[w]hen the FEC issues advisory opinions that prohibit 
speech, ‘[m]any persons, rather than undertake the considerable 
burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through 
case-by-case litigation, will choose simply to abstain from 
protected speech.’”203 The risk of vindicating a corporation’s 
speech rights through litigation is especially acute in the off-label 
promotion realm: if a manufacturer is found guilty of criminally 
misbranding its drug,204 the Health and Human Services Office of 
the Inspector General (OIG) may preclude the manufacturer from 
                                                          
198 WLF III Decision Notice, supra note 17, at 14, 287. 
199 GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16 § III. 
200 See WLF III Decision Notice, supra note 17, at 14, 287. 
201 Cf. Citizens United v. F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876, 896 (2010) (noting that the 
FEC’s regulation of corporate political speech left corporations to choose to 
remain silent or request permission to speak). 
202 Cf. id. at 895 (citing 2 U.S.C.A. § 437(f) (2006)) (same). 
203 Id. at 896 (citing Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)). 
204 See, e.g., United States v. Caputo 456 F. Supp. 2d 970 (N.D. Ill. 2006) 
aff’d in part, vacated in part 517 F.3d. 935 (7th Cir. 2008). See also United 
States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (denying motion to 
dismiss indictment in part because 21 C.F.R. §801.4 does not offend the First 
Amendment). 
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receiving reimbursement from Medicaid and Medicare for 
prescriptions of any drug it manufactures.205 Manufacturers 
“cannot realistically challenge the government in court [on] . . . 
whether the charges alleged are compatible with the 
Constitution . . . . The risk/reward calculus is skewed dramatically 
in favor of settlement when a loss would jeopardize the 
[manufacturer’s] viability by forfeiting government reimbursement 
for its products.”206  
While the similarities between a system of regulatory 
patchwork and the odious, traditional, form of prior restraint in 
which “prospective speakers are not compelled by law” to seek 
permission from the government may not be obvious,207 both 
systems chill speech in a similar way. The Supreme Court has 
previously declared unconstitutional regulations that, while not 
traditionally a prior restraint, function collectively in much the 
same way.208 In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, the Court struck 
down a Rhode Island law designed to shield youth from books that 
the state considered to be obscene, immoral, or impure.209 The 
statute enabled the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage 
Morality in Youth to “investigat[e] situations which may cause . . . 
undesirable behavior of juveniles . . . [and] recommend legislation, 
prosecution, and/or treatment that would ameliorate or eliminate 
said causes.”210 The Commission, after having determined that a 
                                                          
205 See Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revised OIG Exclusions 
Authorities Resulting from Public Law 104-191, 63 Fed. Reg. 46,676, 46,686 
(Sept. 2, 1998). 
206 Osborn, supra note 88, at 328 (emphasis added). The result is often 
astronomical settlement figures from manufacturers with varying degrees of 
culpability yet uniformly desperate to maintain their financial solvency. See, 
e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Pharm. Giant AstraZeneca to Pay $520 
Million for Off-label Drug Mktg. (Apr. 27, 2010), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-civ-487.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Health 
and Human Servs., Justice Dep’t. Announces Largest Health Care Fraud 
Settlement in its History (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ 
news/press/2009pres/09/20090902a.html (announcing a $2.3 Billion settlement). 
207 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 895. 
208 See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64 (1963). 
209 Id. 
210 1959 R.I. Acts & Resolves 880. 
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particular book was obscene,211 sent notices to publishers and 
bookstores, announcing that the condemned books could not be 
sold, displayed, or distributed to customers under the age of 
eighteen and threatening that “[t]he Attorney General will act for 
us in the case of non-compliance.”212 Upon receiving such notice, 
the petitioners ceased to publish or offer for sale the banned 
books.213 The Supreme Court found that Rhode Island’s scheme 
constituted a system of prior restraints214 in part because “[t]he 
distributor [was] left to speculate whether the Commission 
considers [a] publication obscene or simply harmful to juvenile 
morality,” and “the ‘cooperation’ [the Commission sought] from 
distributors invariably entail[ed] the complete suppression of the 
listed publication.”215 
IV. FROM CARONIA ONWARD: A ROUTE FORWARD 
In conducting its Central Hudson analysis, Caronia erred in 
two ways, resulting ultimately in an incorrect ruling on three of the 
four Central Hudson prongs. First, the court too willingly accepted 
as “substantial” the FDA’s interest in subjecting new uses of 
medications to FDA approval,216 and therefore did not consider the 
actual interest the FDA is charged with protecting.217 Second, this 
error resulted in Caronia’s finding that the regulation served a 
substantial government interest under Central Hudson’s third 
prong.218 Finally, despite acknowledging the consumer savvy of 
the physicians to whom off-label promotion is directed,219 the court 
                                                          
211  See Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 64. The commission defined “obscene” 
more broadly than the meaning of obscene under the First Amendment. Id. 
212 Id. at 62 n.5. 
213 Id. at 63. 
214 Id. at 70. 
215 Id. at 71. 
216 See United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
217 See infra Part VI.A. 
218 See infra Part IV.B. 
219 See Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 397–98. 
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errantly followed the flawed reasoning of Caputo,220 failing to find 
a less speech-restrictive alternative to absolute prohibition of an 
entire class of commercial speech.221 This section addresses each 
of these errors in turn, and proposes an alternative that, while 
protecting the FDA’s mission, would also protect the First 
Amendment rights of manufacturers as speakers. 
A. The Government’s Substantial Interest Redefined 
Courts considering the constitutionality of the FDA’s 
prohibition on off-label promotion thus far222 have erred in their 
conception of the government’s substantial interest served by 
regulating off-label promotion. The root of the FDA’s regulatory 
authority is the FDCA.223 In the FDCA, Congress announced the 
purpose of the agency: 
The [Food and Drug] Administration shall— 
(1) Promote the public health by promptly and efficiently 
reviewing clinical research and taking appropriate action on 
the marketing of regulated products in a timely manner; 
(2) . . . protect the public health by ensuring that . . . (b) 
human . . . drugs are safe and effective . . . .224 
Yet despite the clear Congressional mandate that the FDA 
promote public health, the FDA’s purpose has been distorted or 
misconceived repeatedly by both the FDA and courts in litigation 
surrounding the constitutionality of the FDA’s regulation of off-
label promotion.225 
WLF I recognized that Supreme Court precedent has repeatedly 
held the protection of the public’s health and safety to be a 
                                                          
220 See United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
221 See Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 401; see also infra Part IV.C. 
222 See generally Alliance for Natural Health U.S. v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 
2d 48 (D.D.C. 2010); Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 385; Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 
at 912; WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated sub nom. WLF III, 202 
F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Complaint, Allergan, supra note 46. 
223 Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–99 (West 2010). 
224 Id. §§ 393(b)(1–2) (emphasis added). 
225 See, e.g., Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 398; Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 
921; WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 70–71. 
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substantial government interest, and admonished that “[a]ny claim 
that the government’s general interest is insufficient under Central 
Hudson is frivolous.”226 Certainly, that interest is substantial, if not 
compelling; but the court went further to assess the government’s 
purported interests.227 It properly rejected the government’s 
contention that the FDA could restrict speech out of fear that the 
information will be misused228 because “[i]f there is one fixed 
principle in the commercial speech arena, it is that ‘a State’s 
paternalistic assumption that the public will use truthful, 
nonmisleading commercial information unwisely cannot justify a 
decision to suppress it.’”229 It accepted, however, the argument that 
the FDA had a substantial interest in compelling manufacturers to 
subject uses of a drug to the FDA approval process.230 WLF I 
noted, apparently with approval, that conditioning a 
manufacturer’s ability to disseminate any information about a 
particular use of its drug on FDA approval would “encourage[], if 
not compel[]” the manufacturer to seek approval for off-label uses 
of its drugs.231 The Caputo court adopted the WLF I reasoning 
regarding substantial government interest232 and held that 
permitting off-label promotion would “completely undermine the 
government’s interest in subjecting off-label uses to the FDA’s 
evaluation process as well as the government’s interest in 
preserving the integrity of the FDCA’s new drug approval 
process.”233 
Caronia adopted the reasoning from WLF I and Caputo, 
recognizing “the government’s substantial interest in subjecting 
off-label uses of a drug . . . to the FDA’s evaluation process.”234 
                                                          
226 WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 69. 
227 See id. at 69–70. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. (citing 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 (1996)). 
230 Id. at 70. 
231 Id. 
232 United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
233 Id. 
234 United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(citing, inter alia, WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 70–71; Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 
921). 
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Although it acknowledged the government’s substantial interest in 
ensuring the health and safety of its citizens, identified in WLF I,235 
it erred in accepting the FDA’s interest in compelling 
manufacturers to seek additional indications via the FDA approval 
process as an additional substantial interest.236 Perhaps even more 
obviously, its adoption of Caputo’s holding that the success of the 
FDCA is a substantial government interest237 betrays a 
fundamental misconception of the policies and purposes served by 
the FDA’s approval process.238 “Preserving the integrity”239 of a 
statutory scheme such as the FDCA is no more a substantial 
government interest than is preserving the integrity of Rhode 
Island’s law forbidding advertisement of retail alcoholic 
beverages.240 Ensuring the success of a law must be subordinated 
to constitutional concerns.241 Subjecting new uses of drugs to the 
FDA’s approval process and ensuring the rigor of the FDCA are 
means to an end—namely, promoting the public health and 
safety—but neither is an end unto itself.242 The substantial—
indeed compelling—interest served by the FDA’s regulatory 
scheme is, and should be conceived of as, ensuring public health 
                                                          
235 See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 69. 
236 See Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 921; WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 70–71. 
237 Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 921 (citing Thompson v. Western States 
Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357, 369 (2002)). 
238 See Ball, Duffy & Russakoff, supra note 88, at 7–9 (implying that 
courts applying Western States have improperly balanced this interest against 
free speech rights). 
239 Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 921. 
240 Compare 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489–90, 490 n.2 
(1996) with Rhode Island Gen. Laws § 3-8-7 (1987). 
241 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“Certainly all those 
who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the 
fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of 
every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the 
constitution, is void.” (emphasis added)). 
242 Even assuming, arguendo, however, that the government may have a 
substantial interest in subjecting new drug uses to FDA scrutiny, less restrictive 
means of achieving this goal are available. The proposed disclosure requirement, 
see infra Part IV.C, would advance this goal by incentivizing manufacturers to 
seek to bolster their promotional claims with the FDA’s approval. 
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and safety: this comports with Congress’ intent in forming the 
FDA,243 with the history of drug regulation generally,244 and with 
the FDA’s conception of its own mandate.245 
B. Medical Marketplace, Meet the Marketplace of Ideas: Off-
Label Speech Directly Advances Public Health and 
Safety 
Promotion of public health and safety is best served by the free 
exchange of truthful, non-misleading information regarding 
potential drug therapies, regardless of whether a particular use has 
been approved by the FDA.246 The WLF I Court recognized this 
fact, writing: 
the open dissemination of scientific and medical 
information regarding [off-label] treatments is of great 
import. The FDA acknowledges that physicians need 
reliable and up-to-date information concerning off-label 
                                                          
243 See Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 393(b)(1)–(2) (West 
2010). 
244 See generally JAMES T. O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 
§§ 3.1–3.12 (3d ed. 2005). The precursor to the FDA was the Department of 
Chemistry. The Pure Food and Drugs Act was passed in 1906, see Pure Food 
and Drug Act, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), in response to public outcry over the 
abhorrent conditions in meat-packing facilities. See generally UPTON SINCLAIR, 
THE JUNGLE (1905). The Act announced as the Department of Chemistry’s 
purpose “preventing the manufacture, sale, or transportation of . . . misbranded . 
. . or deleterious foods, drugs, medicines, and liquors . . . .” Pure Food and Drug 
Act, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). In 1912, through the Sherley Amendment, the category 
of misbranding offenses was expanded to include false or fraudulent statements 
about drugs. 37 Stat. 416 (1911). The Department of Chemistry was reorganized 
and dissolved in 1927, leading to the formation of the FDA. O’REILLY, supra, § 
3.3 (3d ed. 2005). 
245 What We Do, FDA.GOV (last updated Nov. 18, 2010) http://www.fda. 
gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/default.htm (“protecting the public health by 
assuring the safety, efficacy, and security of human . . . drugs” (emphasis 
added)). 
246 See Ball, Duffy & Russakoff, supra note 88, at 7 (“[S]urely there is . . . 
a substantial interest in providing open access to available data about 
unapproved uses for drugs because it results in more informed and therefore 
safer medical decision making.”). 
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uses . . . . The need for reliable information is particularly 
acute in the off-label treatment area because the primary 
source of information usually available to physicians – the 
FDA approved label – is absent.247 
Under the current regulatory scheme, manufacturers are 
prohibited from distributing truthful, non-misleading information 
that is not in the current, FDA-approved labeling.248 This state of 
affairs is anathema to the promotion of public health and safety 
repeatedly recognized to be a substantial or even compelling 
interest: “the FDA’s public protection mandate should lead it . . . to 
welcome the wide circulation of contemporaneous and accurate 
scientific data on off-label pros and cons.”249 Indeed, the FDA 
itself envisions its function with regard to drugs as “protecting the 
public health by assuring the safety, efficacy, and security of 
human . . . drugs[;] advancing the public health by helping to speed 
innovations . . . [;] and by helping the public get the accurate, 
science-based information they need to use medicines and foods to 
maintain and improve their health.”250 Recently, the FDA appears 
to have recognized that its prohibition of off-label speech may 
diminish public health.251 The government’s interest is served, not 
                                                          
247 WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 56 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated sub nom. WLF III, 
202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). See also id. at 55 (noting that 
an inherent contradiction in the FDA’s regulation of off-label promotion is that 
“what a manufacturer may lawfully claim that a drug does under the statutory 
and regulatory scheme, and what a physician may prescribe a drug for, do not 
match”). 
248 See Osborn, supra note 88, at 328. 
249 Smith, supra note 43, at 971; see also Fritch, supra note 70, at 364 
(advocating mandatory disclosure by pharmaceutical manufacturers of all 
clinical data regarding the drugs they promote). 
250 What We Do, FDA.gov, supra note 245 (emphasis added). 
251 See GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16 § III (“[The] FDA does 
recognize, however, the important public health and policy justification 
supporting dissemination of truthful and non-misleading medical journal articles 
and medical or scientific reference publications on [off-label] uses of approved 
drugs . . . to healthcare professionals and healthcare entities. . . . These off-label 
uses or treatment regimens may be important and may even constitute a 
medically recognized standard of care. Accordingly, the public health may be 
advanced by healthcare professionals’ receipt of medical [literature] on 
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by suppression of off-label information, but by its dissemination.252  
Critics of this position point to the potential for manufacturers 
to manipulate or mislead physicians by sharing only favorable 
information regarding their products.253 This complaint is 
unfounded for three reasons. First, as noted above, off-label 
promotion is not inherently misleading.254 Second, even assuming 
a manufacturer did attempt to mislead physicians, market 
competition would drive the dissemination of not only favorable 
information, but also information revealing any risks or 
inefficacies of the drugs.255 Competing manufacturers, insurance 
companies, pharmacy benefit managers, and states often 
“counterdetail” by disseminating information about either the 
superior efficacy of their own product or the lack of efficacy in 
their competitors’ drugs.256 Thus, while the manufacturer of drug 
                                                          
unapproved new uses of approved or cleared medical products that are truthful 
and not misleading.” (emphasis added)). 
252 See Peter E. Kalb & Paul E. Greenberg, Legal and Economic 
Perspectives Concerning US Government Investigations of Alleged Off-Label 
Promotion by Drug Manufacturers, 27 PHARMACOECONOMICS 623, 624 (2009) 
(“[I]t may follow that suppressing untruthful or misleading information 
advances public health, but there is no reason to believe that suppressing the 
dissemination of truthful, non-misleading information will have that same 
effect.”); Byron Stier, Promotion of Off-Label Use: In Favor of a Regulatory 
Retreat, 19 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH. 609, 609 (2009) (arguing that “the FDA’s 
background prohibition on off-label promotion should recede and just go away” 
in part because the prohibition “is counterproductive because it curtails the 
dissemination of useful information that doctors need to make informed 
judgments”). 
253 See Marc J. Scheineson & M. Lynn Sykes, Major New Initiatives 
Require Increased Disclosure of Clinical Trial Information, 60 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 525, 543 (2005) (noting that “there have been a number of allegations of 
pharmaceutical and device companies selectively disclosing favorable clinical 
trials and/or failing to disclose unfavorable clinical trial results”). But see infra 
Part IV.C (discussing a potential disclosure solution). 
254 See United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 397–98 (E.D.N.Y. 
2008); WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 65–69 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated sub nom. WLF 
III, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000). See also supra §§ II.C.1–2. 
255 Cf. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 
U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) (noting the hardiness of commercial speech). 
256 See, e.g., IMS Health, Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir. 2010) 
cert granted 131 S.Ct. 857 (2011) (indicating Vermont has a “counter-speech” 
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X may trumpet to physicians a new study showing a promising 
new use for drug X, the manufacturer of competing drug Y has an 
economic incentive to inform those same physicians of five studies 
showing that drug X is inefficacious for that use. The result is the 
dissemination of a broad range of scientific information, leading to 
a richer marketplace of ideas and a better-informed medical 
community.  
Third, the paternalistic view that the government may suppress 
speech where the recipients of the speech may misuse the 
information provided has been repeatedly rejected in the context of 
off-label promotion,257 and beyond.258 The Supreme Court has 
noted that “people will perceive their own best interests if only 
they are well enough informed, and . . . the best means to that end 
is to open the channels of communication rather than to close 
them.”259 Furthermore, the Second Circuit recently struck down a 
paternalistic Vermont statute that limited the availability to doctors 
of information regarding medications.260 Vermont prohibited 
manufacturers from using information about physicians’ 
prescribing habits, compiled and sold by data mining companies, 
in order to tailor promotional speech to each physician’s need.261 
                                                          
program in place to disseminate information to physicians). 
257 See Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 398 (citing 44 Liquormart v. Rhode 
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 (1996)); WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 69–70 (“To the 
extent that the FDA is endeavoring to keep information from physicians out of 
concern that they will misuse that information, the regulation is wholly and 
completely unsupportable.”). 
258 See Citizens United v. F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876, 896 (2010) (holding that 
the government may not “select what . . . speech is safe for public consumption 
by applying an ambiguous test”); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 497; Cent. Hudson 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980) (“[W]e 
have rejected the ‘highly paternalistic’ view that government has complete 
power to suppress or regulate commercial speech.”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 
425 U.S. at 770. 
259 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. 
260 IMS Health, 630 F.3d at 267 (“We conclude that because [the 
challenged statute] is a commercial speech restriction that does not advance the 
substantial state interests asserted by Vermont, and is not narrowly tailored to 
advance those interests, the statute cannot survive intermediate scrutiny under 
Central Hudson.”). 
261 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 4631(a) & (d) (2010). 
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The Vermont legislature gave several justifications for this statute, 
including: (1) the aims of manufacturers in marketing their drugs 
“often . . . conflict with the goals of the state”;262 (2) the 
“marketplace for ideas on medicine safety and effectiveness is 
frequently one-sided” resulting in prescribing based upon 
“incomplete and biased information”;263 and (3) “[p]ublic health is 
ill served by the massive imbalance in information presented to 
doctors.”264 Finding that the Vermont legislature “inten[ded] to 
interfere with the marketplace of ideas to promote the interests of 
the state,”265 the Second Circuit struck down Vermont’s statute, 
and noted that, even if Vermont succeeded in manipulating 
physicians’ prescribing habits, “the Supreme Court reminds us that 
‘[i]t is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of 
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely 
available, that the First Amendment makes for us.’”266 
Physicians’ prescribing decisions, and therefore the public 
health, will be improved if physicians are well-informed about 
potential off-label uses. When prescribing medications, physicians 
need to know whether a medication is a safe and effective 
treatment: the research of other physicians, scientists, and 
academics constitutes an essential source of this information.267 
Manufacturers are in a unique position as the most efficient 
aggregators of information about their products, to disseminate 
such information to physicians.268 The FDA’s policy of absolute 
suppression of manufacturer dissemination of this information 
                                                          
262 Vt. Act No. 80 § 1(3) (2007). 
263 Id. § 1(4). 
264 Id. § 1(6). 
265 IMS Health, 630 F.3d at 270 (citing Vt. Act No. 80 § 1). 
266 Id. at 270 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)). 
267 WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 63 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated sub nom. WLF III, 
202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
268 See Stier, supra note 252, at 610–11; Smith, supra note 43, at 971–72. 
See also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24 (“[O]rdinarily the 
advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service 
that he himself provides and presumably knows more about than anyone else.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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frustrates, rather than serves, the interest of enhancing and 
protecting public health. 
C. Less Speech-Restrictive Means of Enhancing Public Health: 
Citizens United’s Approval of Disclosure and 
Disclaimer and the Benefit of Sophisticated Consumers 
Given the clarification of the government’s substantial interest 
in regulating off-label promotion—enhancing public health and 
safety269—and the failing of a complete ban on off-label speech to 
achieve that interest,270 it follows that the current regulatory 
scheme is more restrictive than necessary. Despite Caronia’s 
inability to identify any less speech-restrictive means,271 such 
means do exist and have been proposed.272 The most promising—
and least speech-restrictive—means of regulating off-label 
promotion while remaining respectful of the speakers’ 
constitutional rights comes from what is, at first blush, an unlikely 
source. 
Despite the deep divide between political and commercial 
speech, much of the reasoning in Citizens United applies just as 
well to heavily-regulated commercial speech.273 The parallel 
infirmities of the regulatory schemes at issue in Citizens United 
and Caronia suggest that the less speech-restrictive means 
                                                          
269 See supra Part IV.A. 
270 See supra Part IV.B. 
271 See United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 401–02 (E.D.N.Y. 
2008); see also Ball, Duffy & Russakoff, supra note 88, at 1. 
272 Blackwell & Beck, supra note 88, at 456 (“Other alternatives include: 1) 
permitting off-label promotion to physicians but not consumers; 2) permitting 
promotion through any means other than direct to consumer advertising; 3) 
permitting speech promoting off-label uses except on product labels; and 4) 
simply clarifying the boundaries between dissemination of off-label information 
that is considered promotional and, this, prohibited and dissemination that is 
considered nonpromtional and, thus, permitted.”); see also Ball, Duffy & 
Russakoff, supra note 88, at 1 (proposing alternative means of encouraging 
manufacturers to seek additional indications for their medication while 
respecting free speech rights). 
273 See supra Part III.B. 
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proposed in Citizens United274 would be equally applicable in the 
off-label promotion context. In striking down section 441’s ban on 
corporate independent expenditures, Citizens United upheld the 
requirement that corporations disclose their sponsorship of the 
messages.275 Relying on precedent that found the government’s 
interest in the prevention of real or apparent corruption inadequate 
to justify a ban on independent expenditures,276 the Court held that 
disclosure and disclaimer is a “less restrictive alternative to more 
comprehensive regulations of speech”277 that avoided the 
constitutional infirmities of an outright ban.  
Although First Amendment jurisprudence traditionally frowns 
on compelled speech,278 compelled disclosures in commercial 
speech are favored over the alternative here: complete suppression 
of a particular type of commercial speech.279 Thus, if a required 
disclosure would be a constitutional means of “permit[ting] 
citizens and shareholders to react to the [political] speech of 
corporate entities in a proper way,”280 certainly, it would be 
constitutional in regard to commercial speech, where compelled 
speech is already less problematic,281 in order to facilitate the 
                                                          
274 See Citizens United v. F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010). 
275 Compare id. at 913–14 with Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2 
U.S.C.A. §§ 441d(a)(3), (d)(2) (West 2010). 
276 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 901–02 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 26 (1976)). 
277 Id. at 915. 
278 See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 
(1943) (refusing to sustain a statute mandating a compulsory flag salute in 
public schools); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001) 
(“Just as the First Amendment may prevent the government from prohibiting 
speech, the Amendment may prevent the government from compelling 
individuals to express certain views.”). 
279 See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 73 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated sub nom. WLF 
III, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding “the restrictions in the Guidance 
Documents are considerably more extensive than necessary to further the 
substantial government interest in encouraging manufacturers to get new uses 
on-label”); Bates v. State Bar Ass’n of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1970) 
(noting that the “preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather than less”). 
280 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915. 
281 See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 70. 
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dissemination of accurate information regarding the off-label use 
of drugs. 
Given the fact that a physician is the targeted recipient of the 
off-label speech,282 disclosure would likely be an even more 
effective regulatory strategy in the off-label context than in the 
political speech context. Physicians are sophisticated consumers of 
speech regarding off-label drug uses: they are well aware of the 
implications for safety and efficacy inherent in a prescription 
drug’s off-label status.283 A disclosure to physicians that the 
advocated use (1) is being advanced by a speaker with a 
commercial interest in the product, and (2) has not been approved 
as safe and effective by the FDA, would signal the need for a 
discerning approach to the information provided and caution in the 
use of the drug for that purpose.284 
Concerns have been raised about the potential for a 
manufacturer engaging in off-label promotion to skew the 
information provided to physicians by sharing only favorable 
information about a drug’s efficacy for an off-label use, while 
downplaying or omitting information that suggests inefficacy.285 
Consistent with the First Amendment, the FDA could require 
manufacturers to disseminate a bibliography, complete with 
abstracts, of all scientific literature, favorable and unfavorable, 
discussing the off-label use which the manufacturer proposes.286 In 
                                                          
282 See id. at 63. 
283 See id. (noting that “despite the FDA’s occasional statements in its 
briefs to the contrary, physicians are a highly educated, professionally-trained 
and sophisticated audience”). 
284 See id. at 73 (Faced with such a disclosure, “[a] physician would be 
immediately alerted to the fact that the ‘substantial evidence standard’ had not 
been satisfied, and would evaluate the communicated message accordingly.”). 
285 See Fritch, supra note 70, 357 (“For any given prescription drug 
therapy, there may be a variety of positive and negative studies available, yet 
drug manufacturers are motivated only to promote studies that reflect positively 
on their drug.”). 
286 See, e.g., WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 73. Here, although compelled speech 
is often suspect under First Amendment jurisprudence, it is the lesser of two 
evils. See Bates v. State Bar Ass’n of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1970). For 
example, under such a regime, Mr. Caronia could have discussed with the 
physician the use of Xyrem in fibromyalgia patients, one of the off-label uses he 
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fact, under the FDA’s most recent guidance for the dissemination 
of scientific literature that discusses off-label uses of medications, 
similar requirements exist.287 Given the existence of such a 
requirement, concerns about misleading dissemination of off-label 
information are unfounded. 
Critics of a disclosure-based approach to regulating off-label 
promotion may be concerned that allowing off-label promotion, 
even with disclosure, may circumvent the FDA’s approval 
process;288 however ample opportunities to implement incentives 
to seek on-label status for drugs remain available.289 The 
government would be free to, inter alia 
preempt product liability cases for products that receive 
FDA approval, but preserve product liability theories 
against uses which have not received FDA approval[;] . . . 
provide several economic incentives to encourage 
companies to seek FDA approval for new uses[;] . . . [or] 
establish a streamlined approval process for an already-
approved drugs’ additional widespread uses.290  
                                                          
was originally accused of promoting. If he chose to do so, he would be required 
to provide the physician with a bibliography containing the peer-reviewed, 
medical journal articles discussing this use for Xyrem. See PUBMED, 
http://www.pubmed.gov (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) (search for “sodium oxybate 
fibromyalgia”). 
287 See GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16 § 4.B (mandating that 
manufacturers must disseminate “a comprehensive bibliography of publications 
discussing adequate and well-controlled clinical studies published in medical 
journals or medical or scientific texts about the use of the drug” and “a 
representative publication, when such information exists, that reaches contrary 
or different conclusions regarding the unapproved use”). 
288 See, e.g., United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921 (N.D. Ill. 
2003) (“Manufacturers, knowing that they could promote off-label uses, would 
have an incentive only to seek FDA approval for uses that would be approved 
easily and inexpensively. Thus, the Court holds that subjecting off-label uses to 
the FDA’s evaluation process is a substantial governmental interest.”) But see 
supra, Part IV.A (noting paternalistic fears of misuse of speech does not justify 
suppression of the speech). 
289 Blackwell & Beck, supra note 88, at 456 (listing additional, less speech 
restrictive safeguards against circumvention of the approval process). 
290 Ball, Duffy & Russakoff, supra note 88, at 1. See also Blackwell & 
Beck, supra note 88, at 456. 
LASALLE - FINAL.DOC 5/9/2011  4:16 PM 
 A Prescription for Change 911 
Additionally, the very fact that a particular use is off-label may 
give some physicians pause. Even under a disclosure regime, there 
is a clear economic incentive to “get off-label treatments on-
label,”291 obviating the perceived need for the FDA’s current 
oppressive regulatory scheme. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Caronia presents a concrete example of the ramifications for 
free speech inherent in the FDA’s current regulatory regime. 
Fortunately, the constitutional infirmities of the FDA’s scheme can 
be remedied by a straightforward application of First Amendment 
law, including, in particular, the recent decision in Citizens United. 
The complexity of the FDA’s scheme, like the FEC’s in Citizens 
United, is so abstruse that it essentially functions as a prior 
restraint. This de facto prior restraint is indefensible, however, 
upon a careful examination of the purpose and fit of the FDA’s 
stranglehold on off-label speech. This stranglehold may ensure the 
sanctity of the FDA’s regulatory scheme, but this, in itself, is not a 
substantial governmental interest: the FDA’s only substantial 
interest in regulating off-label promotion is the promotion of 
public health and safety. Dissemination, not suppression, of 
scientific information regarding off-label uses of drugs serves this 
interest. To the extent that concern may linger as to a potential 
conflict of interest between the promotion of public health and the 
manufacturer’s commercial interests, the Supreme Court, in 
Citizens United, has approved of a less restrictive means of 
policing this conflict:292 candid disclosure of the manufacturer’s 
financial interest in the off-label speech should replace the current 
prohibition.293 An appeal of Caronia is currently pending:294 
therefore the Second Circuit, and potentially the Supreme Court, 
                                                          
291 United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
292 Citizens United v. F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010). 
293 See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 73 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated sub nom. WLF 
III, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
294 See Unofficial Oral Argument Transcript, United States v. Caronia, No. 
09 Cr. 5006 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2010) (on file with author); Caronia Brief, supra 
note 1. 
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will soon have the opportunity to correct the constitutional 
deprivations currently worked by the FDA and to extend protection 
to a subset of commercial speech essential to the public health. 
 
